forked from neil/lxc-templates
46 lines
2.5 KiB
Plaintext
46 lines
2.5 KiB
Plaintext
# This derives from the global common config
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lxc.include = @LXCTEMPLATECONFIG@/common.conf
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# Gentoo security oriented default configuration
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# This is a more security oriented container configuration
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# "More" because this is far from fully secure
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# Looking for more working features and you trust your
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# Container user ? see gentoo.common.conf
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# do not mount sysfs, see http://blog.bofh.it/debian/id_413
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lxc.mount.entry=mqueue dev/mqueue mqueue rw,nodev,noexec,nosuid,create=dir 0 0
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lxc.mount.entry=shm dev/shm tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,create=dir 0 0
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lxc.mount.entry=run run tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,mode=755 0 0
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# Capabilities
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# Uncomment these if you don't run anything that needs the capability, and
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# would like the container to run with less privilege.
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#
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# Dropping sys_admin disables container root from doing a lot of things
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# that could be bad like re-mounting lxc fstab entries rw for example,
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# but also disables some useful things like being able to nfs mount, and
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# things that are already namespaced with ns_capable() kernel checks, like
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# hostname(1).
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# lxc.cap.drop = sys_admin # breaks systemd
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# lxc.cap.drop = net_raw # breaks dhcp/ping
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# lxc.cap.drop = setgid # breaks login (initgroups/setgroups)
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# lxc.cap.drop = dac_read_search # breaks login (pam unix_chkpwd)
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# lxc.cap.drop = setuid # breaks sshd,nfs statd
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# lxc.cap.drop = audit_control # breaks sshd (set_loginuid failed)
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# lxc.cap.drop = audit_write
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# lxc.cap.drop = setpcap # breaks journald
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# lxc.cap.drop = sys_resource # breaks systemd
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# lxc.cap.drop = sys_boot # breaks sysvinit
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lxc.cap.drop = audit_control audit_write dac_read_search fsetid ipc_owner linux_immutable mknod setfcap setpcap sys_admin sys_nice sys_pacct sys_ptrace sys_rawio sys_resource sys_tty_config syslog
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# WARNING: the security vulnerability reported for 'cap_net_admin' at
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# http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
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# via JIT spraying (the BPF JIT module disabled on most systems was used
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# in the example, but others are suggested vulnerable) meant that users
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# with root in a container, that capability and kernel module may escape
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# the container. ALWAYS be extremely careful granting any process root
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# within a container, use a minimal configuration at all levels -
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# including the kernel - and multiple layers of security on any system
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# where security is a priority. note that not only LXC but PAX (and
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# others?) were vulnerable to this issue.
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