Update to 1.1.3.

- Remove patches applied upstream.
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Moschny 2015-08-16 14:54:39 +02:00
parent cf3c9ccc09
commit 4283bef697
6 changed files with 8 additions and 325 deletions

1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ lxc-0.7.2.tar.gz
/lxc-1.1.0.tar.gz
/lxc-1.1.1.tar.gz
/lxc-1.1.2.tar.gz
/lxc-1.1.3.tar.gz

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@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
From f50da74a71f2c33f869e6da15f131bf5c9174c12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 09:26:17 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than
/run/lock/lxc
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
---
src/lxc/lxclock.c | 47 ++++++++++-------------------------------------
src/tests/locktests.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lxc/lxclock.c b/src/lxc/lxclock.c
index fe13898..e9e95f7 100644
--- a/src/lxc/lxclock.c
+++ b/src/lxc/lxclock.c
@@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n)
char *rundir;
/* lockfile will be:
- * "/run" + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if root
+ * "/run" + "/lxc/lock/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if root
* or
- * $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if non-root
+ * $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR + "/lxc/lock/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if non-root
*/
- /* length of "/lock/lxc/" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' */
- len = strlen("/lock/lxc/") + strlen(n) + strlen(p) + 3;
+ /* length of "/lxc/lock/" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' */
+ len = strlen("/lxc/lock/") + strlen(n) + strlen(p) + 3;
rundir = get_rundir();
if (!rundir)
return NULL;
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n)
return NULL;
}
- ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s", rundir, p);
+ ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lxc/lock/%s", rundir, p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
@@ -128,40 +128,13 @@ static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n)
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
- /* fall back to "/tmp/" + $(id -u) + "/lxc" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0'
- * * maximum length of $(id -u) is 10 calculated by (log (2 ** (sizeof(uid_t) * 8) - 1) / log 10 + 1)
- * * lxcpath always starts with '/'
- */
- int l2 = 22 + strlen(n) + strlen(p);
- if (l2 > len) {
- char *d;
- d = realloc(dest, l2);
- if (!d) {
- free(dest);
- free(rundir);
- return NULL;
- }
- len = l2;
- dest = d;
- }
- ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s", geteuid(), p);
- if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
- free(dest);
- free(rundir);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
- if (ret < 0) {
- free(dest);
- free(rundir);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s/.%s", geteuid(), p, n);
- } else
- ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s/.%s", rundir, p, n);
+ free(dest);
+ free(rundir);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lxc/lock/%s/.%s", rundir, p, n);
free(rundir);
-
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
return NULL;
diff --git a/src/tests/locktests.c b/src/tests/locktests.c
index dd3393a..233ca12 100644
--- a/src/tests/locktests.c
+++ b/src/tests/locktests.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
exit(1);
}
struct stat sb;
- char *pathname = RUNTIME_PATH "/lock/lxc/var/lib/lxc/";
+ char *pathname = RUNTIME_PATH "/lxc/lock/var/lib/lxc/";
ret = stat(pathname, &sb);
if (ret != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: filename %s not created\n", __LINE__,
--
2.4.3

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@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
From ef62305193a5bb7ec00ccf00451be4ff0efac3ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?St=C3=A9phane=20Graber?= <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 16:37:51 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during
attach
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
---
src/lxc/attach.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lxc/attach.c b/src/lxc/attach.c
index 69dafd4..436ae7a 100644
--- a/src/lxc/attach.c
+++ b/src/lxc/attach.c
@@ -76,6 +76,82 @@
lxc_log_define(lxc_attach, lxc);
+int lsm_set_label_at(int procfd, int on_exec, char* lsm_label) {
+ int labelfd = -1;
+ int ret = 0;
+ const char* name;
+ char* command = NULL;
+
+ name = lsm_name();
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "nop") == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* We don't support on-exec with AppArmor */
+ if (strcmp(name, "AppArmor") == 0)
+ on_exec = 0;
+
+ if (on_exec) {
+ labelfd = openat(procfd, "self/attr/exec", O_RDWR);
+ }
+ else {
+ labelfd = openat(procfd, "self/attr/current", O_RDWR);
+ }
+
+ if (labelfd < 0) {
+ SYSERROR("Unable to open LSM label");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "AppArmor") == 0) {
+ int size;
+
+ command = malloc(strlen(lsm_label) + strlen("changeprofile ") + 1);
+ if (!command) {
+ SYSERROR("Failed to write apparmor profile");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ size = sprintf(command, "changeprofile %s", lsm_label);
+ if (size < 0) {
+ SYSERROR("Failed to write apparmor profile");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (write(labelfd, command, size + 1) < 0) {
+ SYSERROR("Unable to set LSM label");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(name, "SELinux") == 0) {
+ if (write(labelfd, lsm_label, strlen(lsm_label) + 1) < 0) {
+ SYSERROR("Unable to set LSM label");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ ERROR("Unable to restore label for unknown LSM: %s", name);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ free(command);
+
+ if (labelfd != -1)
+ close(labelfd);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static struct lxc_proc_context_info *lxc_proc_get_context_info(pid_t pid)
{
struct lxc_proc_context_info *info = calloc(1, sizeof(*info));
@@ -570,6 +646,7 @@ struct attach_clone_payload {
struct lxc_proc_context_info* init_ctx;
lxc_attach_exec_t exec_function;
void* exec_payload;
+ int procfd;
};
static int attach_child_main(void* data);
@@ -622,6 +699,7 @@ int lxc_attach(const char* name, const char* lxcpath, lxc_attach_exec_t exec_fun
char* cwd;
char* new_cwd;
int ipc_sockets[2];
+ int procfd;
signed long personality;
if (!options)
@@ -833,6 +911,13 @@ int lxc_attach(const char* name, const char* lxcpath, lxc_attach_exec_t exec_fun
rexit(-1);
}
+ procfd = open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
+ if (procfd < 0) {
+ SYSERROR("Unable to open /proc");
+ shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
+ rexit(-1);
+ }
+
/* attach now, create another subprocess later, since pid namespaces
* only really affect the children of the current process
*/
@@ -860,7 +945,8 @@ int lxc_attach(const char* name, const char* lxcpath, lxc_attach_exec_t exec_fun
.options = options,
.init_ctx = init_ctx,
.exec_function = exec_function,
- .exec_payload = exec_payload
+ .exec_payload = exec_payload,
+ .procfd = procfd
};
/* We use clone_parent here to make this subprocess a direct child of
* the initial process. Then this intermediate process can exit and
@@ -898,6 +984,7 @@ static int attach_child_main(void* data)
{
struct attach_clone_payload* payload = (struct attach_clone_payload*)data;
int ipc_socket = payload->ipc_socket;
+ int procfd = payload->procfd;
lxc_attach_options_t* options = payload->options;
struct lxc_proc_context_info* init_ctx = payload->init_ctx;
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
@@ -1038,13 +1125,11 @@ static int attach_child_main(void* data)
close(ipc_socket);
/* set new apparmor profile/selinux context */
- if ((options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM)) {
+ if ((options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM) && init_ctx->lsm_label) {
int on_exec;
on_exec = options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM_EXEC ? 1 : 0;
- ret = lsm_process_label_set(init_ctx->lsm_label,
- init_ctx->container->lxc_conf, 0, on_exec);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ if (lsm_set_label_at(procfd, on_exec, init_ctx->lsm_label) < 0) {
rexit(-1);
}
}
@@ -1095,6 +1180,9 @@ static int attach_child_main(void* data)
}
}
+ /* we don't need proc anymore */
+ close(procfd);
+
/* we're done, so we can now do whatever the user intended us to do */
rexit(payload->exec_function(payload->exec_payload));
}
--
2.4.3

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@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/src/lua-lxc/core.c b/src/lua-lxc/core.c
index 630a3e4..34180a7 100644
--- a/src/lua-lxc/core.c
+++ b/src/lua-lxc/core.c
@@ -39,8 +39,10 @@
#endif
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM >= 503
+#ifndef luaL_checkunsigned
#define luaL_checkunsigned(L,n) ((lua_Unsigned)luaL_checkinteger(L,n))
#endif
+#endif
#ifdef NO_CHECK_UDATA
#define checkudata(L,i,tname) lua_touserdata(L, i)

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@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
%global shortcommit %(c=%{commit}; echo ${c:0:7})
Name: lxc
Version: 1.1.2
Release: %{?prerel:0.}2%{?prerel:.%{prerel}}%{?dist}
Version: 1.1.3
Release: %{?prerel:0.}1%{?prerel:.%{prerel}}%{?dist}
Summary: Linux Resource Containers
Group: Applications/System
License: LGPLv2+ and GPLv2
@ -42,11 +42,6 @@ Source0: https://github.com/lxc/lxc/archive/%{commit}/%{name}-%{commit}.t
Source0: http://linuxcontainers.org/downloads/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
%endif
Patch0: lxc-1.1.0-fix-init.patch
Patch1: lxc-1.1.2-fix-lua-compat.patch
# upstream commit 61ecf69
Patch2: lxc-1.1.2-fix-CVE-2015-1331.patch
# based on upstream commit 659e807
Patch3: lxc-1.1.2-fix-CVE-2015-1334.patch
BuildRequires: docbook-utils
BuildRequires: docbook2X
BuildRequires: doxygen
@ -186,9 +181,6 @@ This package contains documentation for %{name}.
%prep
%setup -q -n %{name}-%{?!prerel:%{version}}%{?prerel:%{commit}}
%patch0 -p1
%patch1 -p1
%patch2 -p1
%patch3 -p1
%build
@ -309,8 +301,6 @@ fi
%{_datadir}/%{name}/hooks
%{_datadir}/%{name}/%{name}-patch.py*
%{_datadir}/%{name}/selinux
# fixme: should be in libexecdir?
%{_datadir}/%{name}/%{name}-restore-net
%{_libdir}/liblxc.so.*
%{_libdir}/%{name}
%{_libexecdir}/%{name}
@ -389,6 +379,10 @@ fi
%changelog
* Sat Aug 15 2015 Thomas Moschny <thomas.moschny@gmx.de> - 1.1.3-1
- Update to 1.1.3.
- Remove patches applied upstream.
* Sun Aug 2 2015 Thomas Moschny <thomas.moschny@gmx.de> - 1.1.2-2
- Add security fixes, see rhbz#1245939 and rhbz#1245941.

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@ -1 +1 @@
3ebadacf5fe8bfe689fd7a09812b682c lxc-1.1.2.tar.gz
197abb5a28ab0b689c737eb1951023fb lxc-1.1.3.tar.gz